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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
Happy birthday, Mr. President 
President Putin celebrated his 52nd birthday on October 7th with a gathering of 
friends, including one of Ukraine’s presidential candidates, and flattering press 
reports on his precocious childhood, featuring a "Hero of our Time" article (in 
Komsomolskaya pravda) that contained an interview with his former German 
language teacher. (1) 
 
There was, of course, also evidence of political wit at play: Nezavisimaya gazeta 
noted the "coincidence" of the Mariinsky Theatre in St. Petersburg opening its 
222nd season on Putin’s birthday with a production of Glinka’s opera, "A Life for 
the Tsar." While this tale, which is set in the time of the troubles in the 17th 
century and tells the story of a peasant who sacrifices his life to save the Tsar 
from Polish assassins, had been a traditional season opener before the 
Bolshevik revolution, the theatre management has chosen an intriguing time to 
revive the tradition. The opening night’s performance on October 7th was a sell-
out. (2) 
 
Personnel moves 
With the "promotion" of Dmitri Kozak to the post of Southern Russia/Caucasus 
Tsar, one of the deputy heads of the government apparatus, Sergei Naryshkin, 
was appointed to replace Kozak as government Chief-of-Staff. (3) 
 
Naryshkin worked alongside Vladimir Putin in the St. Petersburg Mayor’s office 
under Anatoli Sobchak, and also served as an aide to the economic advisor in 
the Soviet (and later Russian) embassy in Belgium. (4) This background 
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suggests a connection to foreign intelligence work, thus making Naryshkin yet 
another of the siloviki in Putin’s administration, as well as another Petersburger. 
Not surprisingly, Naryshkin has announced that "interaction" between the 
Government Secretariat and the security organs has been strengthened in 
response to President Putin’s decrees on anti-terrorism. (5) 
 
One of Naryshkin’s earliest tasks was to supervise the creation of the new 
Ministry of Regional Development, which will combine social, economic, ethnic 
and security concerns under one ministerial umbrella. At least initially, the 
ministry will focus on southern Russia, the northern Caucasus and Chechnya. 
The new Ministry is short-staffed at the moment, with only 240 employees, but 
Naryshkin seemed assured that the personnel would be supplemented once it is 
created officially. (6) 
 
Kozak also has had to relinquish his chairmanship of the Commission for 
Administrative Reform, which, given the level of criticism that this particular task 
has evoked and the strength of bureaucratic resistance to change, may not be 
too great a sacrifice. The new Chair of the Commission is Deputy Prime Minister 
Aleksandr Zhukov, who will now be responsible for implementing the Kozak 
reforms. (7) May he have better luck than Kozak had with it. 
 
The President’s Special Representative for Resolving the Ossetian-Ingush 
conflict, Aleksei Kulakovsky, who has had a lot to answer for since the Beslan 
tragedy, also has now been dismissed. Kulakovsky’s portfolio, theoretically, will 
be folded into the new remit for Caucasus Tsar Kozak. (8) 
 
President Putin recently decreed minor changes to the composition of the 
Security Council. Leonid Drachevsky, former Presidential Envoy to Siberia [who 
will now be joining U.E.S. as Deputy CEO (9)] and Vladimir Yakovlev, former 
Presidential Envoy to the Southern District, have been replaced by former Chief 
of the General Staff, Anatoli Kvashnin, who takes over for Drachevsky in Siberia, 
 3 
and Dmitri Kozak, who is, of course, the new Southern District Envoy. Yuri 
Baluyevsky, the new Chief of the General Staff also has been added to the 
Council. (10) These changes appear to be primarily pro forma: the decree 
concerns individuals added or removed from the Council ex officio, and does not 
seem to reflect their relative proximity to presidential decision-making. By decree, 
Putin established the membership of the Security Council to reflect the 
accoutrements of office rather than personal authority; however, it represents a 
dual system of Security Council membership, with the "permanent members" 
drawn primarily from the security services and the heads of the legislative 
branch, and the "members" reflecting the President’s Representatives, the 
Ministers of Finance, Justice and Emergencies and the Chief of a denuded 
General Staff. (11) Just which members are present at which meetings would be 
an interesting piece of information to obtain from the Kremlin. 
 
Surkov speaks for the administration 
Deputy Chief of the Presidential Administration, Vladislav Surkov, chose an 
interview with Komsomolskaya pravda to expound on the rationale behind the 
President’s changes regarding the political system, and the general reaction to 
the Beslan tragedy. 
 
In response to a question of "Why us?"–Why terrorist incidents like Beslan 
happen to Russia–Surkov answered by dividing "the people making decisions in 
America, Europe and the East" into two groups: those who "believe our 
democracy has a future"; and those whose "goal is the destruction of Russia and 
the establishment of numerous ineffectual quasi-states in its vast expanses." (12) 
The interviewer did not, apparently, follow up to determine whether Russia’s 
"vast expanses" included the territory of the former Soviet Union, thus suggesting 
that the Independent States around Russia’s borders might be endangered by 
Putin’s response to terrorism. 
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Surkov did couch the conflicts in the Caucasus and elsewhere along Russia’s 
"southern borders" in historical terms, claiming that violence in the region with the 
goal of weakening Russia "was already practiced in the 19th and 20th centuries." 
(13) He also rebuked those who call for dialogue with Chechens over the 
question of independence, by highlighting how poorly governed Chechnya was in 
the late 1990s, when it gained de facto independence from Russia with the 
Khasavyurt agreement, blaming "Ichkerian gangs" for the lawlessness and 
violence of the region (and chastising human rights organizations for not 
speaking louder then). 
 
When questioned on the purpose of Putin’s internal political reforms, Surkov 
reminded his audience that the underlying goal (apparently of terrorists and 
critics alike) was the "destruction of the Russian state." Putin therefore was 
"obligated to implement the constitutional principle of the unity of the executive 
branch of government to the fullest extent." (14) Surkov identified an interesting 
result of this unity: "The competition between the centre and the territories for the 
evasion of responsibility for political errors and organizational shortcomings will 
cease." (15) Apparently, the way to subvert external threats of violence and 
silence foreign critics is to stop Russian bureaucrats from trying to blame each 
other for administrative mistakes. 
 
Other reforms, such as the creation of a Public Chamber, which will by inhabited 
by "experts" rather than the public, was conceived as a channel, not for social 
oversight of a weighted executive arm, but rather, according to Surkov: "The new 
body would be expected to place the bureaucracy under civil oversight and 
guarantee public appraisal of major legislative bills and administrative 
ordinances." (16) 
 
Surkov’s tunnel vision with regard to the need for the "power vertical" to 
emasculate local, regional, and perhaps even some central administrators and 
apparatchiki, is likely to be the product of two experiences: the first involves the 
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repeated efforts at reform of the government, the Kozak reforms being the most 
recent, and the repeated failures — graft and corruption are still rife in the Russia 
administration (and Russia is by no means alone in this quandary). The second 
experience was described by Surkov himself. It is the hangover of the Soviet era, 
mixed with the turmoil of transition: "The moral crisis that came into being within 
the pseudo-collectivist communist regime is still raging. The moral majority is 
taking shape too slowly. Meanwhile, the…petty thieves and gossips, informers 
and bribe-takers, con artists and opportunists are as active and agile as they 
were in the old Soviet days." (17) 
 
Surkov’s remedy is "to learn the skills of real collectivism anew. (…) [T]o study 
not the works of Lenin but the experience of civil society." (18) Unfortunately, 
Russian civil society is being denied the sunlight of open media and choked back 
by an oppressive security service presence in government–throughout the 
executive, controlling the legislative and judicial branches and now moving 
through the regions. Coupled with the persecution of wealthy and powerful men 
like Mikhail Khodorkovsky, it sounds like the present administration might make 
Lenin proud. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) Independent Newspapers (U.K.), 8 Oct 04 via Lexis-Nexis Academic 
Database. 
(2) RIA-Novosti, 7 Oct 04 via Lexis-Nexis Academic Database. 
(3) Agence France Presse, 13 Sep 04 via Lexis-Nexis Academic Database. 
(4) Gazeta, #170; RusData Dialine, 15 Sep 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(5) Interfax, 1239 GMT, 2 Oct 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-1002 via World News 
Connection. 
(6) Itar-Tass, 11323 GMT, 2 Oct 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-1002 via World News 
Connection. 
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(7) Prime-Tass (English) Business Newswire, 17 Sep 04 via Lexis-Nexis 
Academic Database. 
(8) Itar-Tass news digest, 7 Oct 04 via Lexis-Nexis Academic Database. 
(9) Prime-TASS, 1601 GMT, 1 Oct 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-1001 via World News 
Connection. 
(10) Itar-Tass, 1 Oct 04; WPS Defense and Security via Lexis-Nexis and Itar-
Tass, 1 Oct 04, 0900 GMT; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis Academic Database. 
(11) (http://www.scrf.gov.ru/Personnels/Members.htm). 
(12) Komsomolskaya Pravda, 29 Sep 04; BBC Monitoring International Reports 
via Lexis-Nexis Academic Database. 
(13) Ibid. 
(14) Ibid. 
(15) Ibid. 
(16) Ibid. 
(17) Ibid. 
(18) Ibid. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Eric Beene 
 
The case of the alleged would-be terrorist Aleksandr Pumane, who reportedly 
died of massive injuries in hospital after having been detained and questioned by 
authorities in Moscow on 18 September, has not been resolved. Original reports 
claimed that Moscow police and security service representatives apprehended 
Pumane, who had delivered a car rigged with explosives to Kutuzovskii Prospekt, 
along the presidential motor route. After a few hours of "questioning" in the early 
morning hours, 38-year old Pumane was delivered to Sklifosovsky hospital where 
he died of massive injuries. (1) Initially dismissed as a case of overzealous 
security personnel attempting to show that they could play hardball with 
terrorists, new developments make this case appear somewhat more sinister. 
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Mr. Pumane’s wife, Natalya, arrived at the morgue on 22 September to identify 
his corpse, but even after half an hour, she could not verify the body was his. In 
fact, she claims to doubt that it is his corpse. Two former co-workers who also 
attempted to identify the body at the morgue, more forcefully denied that it was 
Pumane’s, forcing coroners to refer to dental records. The body in the morgue, 
evidently, is smaller in stature and does not appear to have the same scars that 
Pumane was known to have. (2) 
 
Moreover, investigations have shed new light on Mr. Pumane’s past and his 
actions leading up to his detention and death. Pumane was a retired Russian 
naval officer who, some months earlier, had shown his wife an Interpol badge 
and identification, which he claimed constituted his credentials as a technical 
specialist with that agency. The Russian Interpol bureau refused to confirm his 
status, and his wife did not find the ID and badge among his belongings at the 
morgue. (3) 
 
New details of the events on the night of his detention have been reported. 
Pumane allegedly was detained driving a Lada rigged with land mines and TNT 
set to be detonated with a remote control device. He was detained not by 
counter-terrorism personnel, but by police officers patrolling the area in an effort 
to crack down on a recent spate of car thefts. Pumane allegedly told police, 
during his interrogation, where to find a second car also rigged with explosives. 
According to police, Pumane, a St. Petersburg resident visiting the area to see a 
friend, had been offered $1,000 by a stranger to park the two cars at designated 
locations. (4) Following Pumane’s arrest, reports described a parade of up to 150 
interrogators, including representatives from the Interior Ministry (MVD), the 
Federal Security Service (FSB), and the Main Administration for Combating 
Organized Crime, all eager to question Mr. Pumane. Consequently, while local 
police began the interrogation, there were periods of time during which outside 
agencies led the questioning. (5) 
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The FSB and MVD both have vehemently denied involvement in the beating, 
each blaming the other instead. In what appears to be an effort to protect his own 
position, Vladimir Pronin, chief of the Moscow Police, has either discharged or 
reprimanded ten members of the Moscow police force. Thus far only Major 
Vyacheslav Dushenko, a discharged supervisor with the Moscow police force’s 
organized crime division has been charged with a crime, albeit in absentia–he 
has not been seen recently. As members of the FSB and MVD likely were 
schooled in the value of the information a suspect such as Putame might provide, 
it seems unlikely that professionals of these organizations would commit such a 
crime. (6) 
 
Still, enough inconsistencies have been reported, largely by Kommersant, to fuel 
heated conspiracy theories. Some insist Pumane was put into a witness 
protection program, with some homeless vagrant beaten and left at the morgue 
in his stead; others wonder if it was an interrupted attempt by security services to 
stage a pseudo-terrorist event, to be stopped just in time for the security services 
to claim victory and attempt to repair their reputation so tarnished by the Beslan 
siege. (7) The latter theory mirrors speculation concerning the events linked to 
the discovery, almost five years ago, of what was originally reported as three 
sacks of highly explosive hexogen in the basement of a Ryazan apartment 
building. In the Ryazan case, Aleksei Kartofelnikov, a resident of the apartment, 
reported to the police suspicious activity by individuals loading sacks into the 
basement. Police evacuated the building and carted the sacks away. The FSB 
later explained that the sacks contained only sugar and were planted there "to 
test local vigilance." Five years later, residents still are not sure whether the FSB 
account is correct, if the sacks actually contained hexogen and locals discovered 
what the security services could not, or even if government agents themselves 
had planted the explosives in an attempt to taint the Chechen cause, but had 
their clandestine plan discovered before it could come to fruition. (8) 
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What is clear is that the Russian mechanism for dealing with suspected terrorists 
and their accomplices is far from standardized or proportionate. The presence of 
so many interested parties indicates no clear line of responsibility in such cases. 
Pumane’s death indicates that there were persons involved in this process, either 
by design or serendipity, who appear to be unschooled in the proper techniques 
of interrogation. As discussed previously, the fact that local police apprehended a 
would-be terrorist is a clear success; his death is a setback, in practical terms 
and in terms of the state’s public image. 
 
However, perhaps help is on the way. On 1 October, the Russian actor Aristarkh 
Livanov announced that he would lead a new non-governmental movement, 
Russia-Antiterror. This effort will have as its goal the "organization of preventative 
measures aimed at averting acts of terror, public monitoring of places of mass 
attendance, the holding of educational sessions and informing the authorities of 
violations discovered in the activities of specific organizations." The movement 
will rely on observations and reports of suspicious activities by members and 
others to the security services in an attempt to subvert terrorist actions before 
another Beslan siege can take place. Anatoli Bozhkov, a member of the Expert 
Council of Russia's "Human Rights Ombudsman," who is another leader of 
Russia-Antiterror, denied that the movement was looking for informants, but 
media reports of the announcement offered skepticism concerning both the 
legitimacy of the movement and its likely effect. It appears that the movement's 
call to action will result in an upswing of "nuisance reports," which may become 
painful reminders of Soviet past. (9) 
 
Livanov was to travel to Rostov-na-Donu, a region noted for its Cossack 
traditions, for the inauguration of a new branch of the movement. Perhaps the 
leadership saw some benefit from linking Russia-Antiterror with the image of Don 
Cossacks, but violence and vigilantism are also a part of the heritage. (10) 
Although the aims of this movement may contain well-intentioned appeals for 
public caution and observation of suspicious acts, given the history of such 
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"popular" movements in the Soviet Union, many in Russia doubt whether chaste 
motives are at play. It remains to be seen, however, whether such a movement, if 
indeed it does take hold in Russia, will have any impact on Russian society. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) See NIS Observed: An Analytical Review Volume IX Number 14 (29 
September 2004). 
(2) "Pumane Was Interpol ‘Technician'," Kommersant, 28 Sep 04. 
(3) Ibid. 
(4) "Car Tied to Bomb Plot Linked to Chechen," by Carl Schreck, St. Petersburg 
Times, 21 Sep 04 via ISI Emerging Markets database. 
(5) "MVD, FSB Reportedly Blaming Each Other for Terrorist Suspect's Death," 
Izvestiya, 21 Sep 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0921 via World News Connection. 
(6) "Policeman charged in absentia in Pumane's death case," ITAR-Tass News 
Agency, 6 Oct 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(7) "Keystone Kops Take on Terrorism," by Yulia Latynina, Moscow Times, 29 
Sep 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(8) "Sacks in the Basement Still Trouble Ryazan," by Anatoly Medetsky, Moscow 
Times, 24 Sep 04 via Johnson’s Russia List (JRL), #8379, 24 Sep 04. 
(9) "Public Organization To Combat Terrorism To Be Set Up," RIA-Novosti, 1 Oct 
04; FBIS-SOV-2004-1001 via World News Connection; "I Squeal to the Soviet 
Union," by Yuliya Taratuta, Kommersant, 2 Oct 04 and "New Counterterrorism 
Organization Established, Begins Work 4 Oct 04," RIA-Novosti, 4 Oct 04; FBIS-
SOV-2004-1004 via World News Connection. 
(10) "Don Cossacks." The Columbia Encyclopedia, Sixth Edition, 2001; online at 
(http://www.bartleby.com/65/do/DonCossa.html). 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Rebecca Mulder 
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"Democracy is never perfect but always evolving towards perfection; democracy 
is not a mere set of laws and institutions but a way of thinking and living…; 
democracy is not immutable but in evolution." (1) 
 
Keeping up with PACE 
The Parliamentary Assembly Council of Europe (PACE), considered the oldest 
international parliamentary assembly (founded in 1949), recently completed its 
autumn session in Strasbourg, which ran from 4-8 October. As one of PACE’s 
forty-six member states, Russia played an important role in this meeting, since 
the Council focused on issues of terrorism, human rights and democracy. 
Russia’s tenuous relationship with Georgia was also a relevant topic of 
discussion. These issues were considered in the context of President Putin’s 
recent initiatives following the Beslan massacre, and both direct and indirect 
challenges were made for Russia to fulfill the conditions of its membership to 
PACE which include pluralistic democracy, the rule of law and respect for human 
rights. Will Russia keep up with PACE in these areas? 
 
PACE and Terrorism 
At the 6 October session, PACE called for a "common legal area" for action 
against terrorism in Europe, including a single definition of terrorism in the laws of 
the Council of Europe’s member states. (2) The resolution and recommendation 
that were adopted at the end of the session were based on a report by Russia’s 
Konstantin Kosachev, which, in summary, stated that the states of Europe have 
not been sufficiently alert to the grave dangers of terrorism, nor have they taken 
effective action to counter them. The report stressed that fighting terrorism must 
always be compatible with human rights and fundamental freedoms and 
envisaged that measures would be taken by PACE, both at national and 
international levels, to strengthen the common response to the challenge of 
terrorism. 
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Mr. Kosachev should be pleased with the outcome of his report, since the 
resolution and recommendations adopted contained numerous proposals that 
would bring members together in the fight against terrorism. The Assembly 
stated that "no cause can justify terrorism" and that "every act of terrorism 
regardless of the reasons given, aims pursued…is a challenge to democracy and 
must be considered a crime against humanity….There are no ‘good’ or ‘bad’ 
terrorists." (3) PACE, however, reaffirmed its position of principle that the fight 
against terrorism must never be incongruous with the fundamental freedoms and 
human rights which it has the task of protecting: "wherever those rights are 
violated this weakens the international coalition in the fight against terrorism, and 
drives new supporters into the hands of the terrorists." (4) Also addressed were 
the supposedly deep-rooted causes of terrorism — poverty, exclusion, inequality, 
despair, impunity, disregard for rights of national minorities — which were 
assumed to provide fertile soil for terrorism. 
 
In spite of the mixed pleasure Mr. Kosachev may have felt regarding his report’s 
outcome, does President Putin have a share in it? He should be pleased that the 
Assembly justified no cause for terrorism, not even Chechen separatism, and for 
the efforts PACE extended to strengthen a European coalition on terror. But what 
about those enumerated deep-rooted causes of terrorism? Is Putin prepared to 
embrace a fight against those, as well? Hate crimes against foreigners, including 
many Caucasians, have increased since Beslan, with innocent people being 
attacked in their homes, on the Metro and in their businesses; sadly, the Moscow 
police has described some of the actions only as "hooliganism." (5) Poverty, 
frustration and despair continue to dominate Chechnya and increasingly its 
surrounding regions — what does Putin plan to do to combat these issues? Little 
emphasis has been given to these core matters; instead the heavy-handed 
approach of response to terror prevails. 
 
PACE, Human Rights and Democracy 
 13 
On 7 October, PACE deliberated extensively on the situation in Chechnya, 
reaffirming its commitment to advance human rights, democracy and the rule of 
law in the Republic, as an integral part of the Russian Federation, deploring the 
grave conditions in which the Chechens have to live. The gross violence which 
persists in Chechnya and continues to be a significant formative factor for a 
whole generation of Chechens, was condemned and the Assembly called for 
concerted action by local, regional and federal Chechen authorities to help 
alleviate the situation. (6) Criminal acts constituting serious human rights 
violations, committed by all sides of the conflict were condemned as well. PACE 
suggested negotiations to help resolve the conflict with all those guilty of crimes 
receiving just punishment through appropriate judicial procedures. (7) The 
Assembly recognized that the conflict within the North Caucasus was spreading 
like an epidemic, threatening the rule of law throughout the Russian Federation 
(8) and must be stopped in order to prevent further casualties, destruction of 
property, forced disappearances, hostage-taking and continued displacement of 
persons from their homes. PACE urged the Russian Duma, as a matter of 
urgency to set up a parliamentary committee of inquiry to investigate alleged 
abuses by different branches of the executive and to address the apparent 
malfunctioning of the military prosecutor’s office in charge of the region. (9) 
However, PACE welcomed the trend of establishing regional ombudsmen in the 
Russian Federation, specifically for the Chechen Republic. Unfortunately, 
PACE's recommendations could not specify solutions, thus generating, instead, 
more questions, such as with whom should Russia negotiate? What judicial 
procedures were in place to punish "all sides" in the Chechen conflict? And what 
actions might PACE take to enforce its proposals. 
 
During the 8 October session, PACE discussed new concepts to evaluate the 
state of democratic development, realizing that such development is insufficient 
in certain member states. PACE believes that democracy today is in a crisis, 
reflected low turn out at elections, lack of interest/participation in public life and 
decreasing respect for and confidence in political parties and politicians. (10) 
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Democratic reform and development to counter the democratic deficit must be 
based on a full integration of democratic norms and practices into the 
administrative, political and judicial systems, including normative standards as 
well as their implementation at an operational level. (11) PACE desires to monitor 
and assist struggling democracies (like Russia) and has constituted parameters 
for evaluation of democracy within a given country. Transparency of 
governmental action and administration, accountability of decision-making bodies 
towards the public, openness of political decision-making, development of 
political pluralism and the way in which parties are financed and function, 
development of civic multiculturalism and equality of citizens, the independence 
of media from government structures and the effectiveness of anti-discrimination 
rules are just some of the evaluative parameters. (12) It is obvious, given Putin’s 
recent political "reforms," crackdown on the media and seeming blindness to 
Russia’s internal ethnic conflicts, that Russia needs to make a sharp reversal in 
these areas if it is going to be judged on par with the level of democracy PACE 
hopes to promote within its member states. Democracy’s nature may be one of 
evolution but it will take real effort to ensure Russian democracy rather than 
witness its collapse under the weight of Putin's increasingly "vertical" 
government. 
 
PACE and Georgia 
On 7 October PACE held an emergency debate regarding increasingly heated 
Georgian-Russian relations. Konstantin Kosachev, the Russian delegation head, 
stated that PACE is not the rostrum for Georgia to settle a score with Russia. He 
came down on Georgian delegates for their allegedly harsh tone and said, "Tbilisi 
has problems with Abkhazia and South Ossetia [separatist regions within 
Georgia]. It ought to settle those problems at home, rather than on the 
international scene." (13) Nino Burjanadze of Georgia’s parliament accused 
Russia of using double standards concerning Chechen and Abkhaz (as well as 
South Ossetian) separatists. 
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Looking ahead 
What lies ahead for Russia at this point, specifically concerning the issues raised 
and discussed during this recent PACE session, depends on Putin’s response. 
Many of Putin’s initiatives were challenged by PACE and concern for the fate of 
democracy in the Russian Federation was evident. Just how this concern 
translates into action, either by motivating Putin, or, if need be, sanctioning him, 
may provide evidence of the effectiveness of PACE. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) Resolution 1407 of Parliamentary Assembly Council of Europe (PACE), "New 
Concepts to Evaluate the State of Democratic Development, 8 Oct 04; 
(assembly.coe.int/Documents/AdoptedText/ta04/ERES1407.html). 
(2) Doc. 10312 of PACE, "Challenge of Terrorism in Council of Europe States"; 5 
Oct 04; (assembly.coe.int). 
(3) Ibid. 
(4) "PACE Calls for ‘Common Legal Area’ for Action Against Terrorism in 
Europe"; 6 Oct 04; [(assembly.coe.int (CPID 1573)]. 
(5) Moscow News, 29 Sep 04 via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(6) Resolution 1402 of PACE, "The Political Situation in the Chechen Republic"; 
7 Oct 04 (assembly.coe.int). 
(7) Resolution 1403 of PACE, "The Human Rights Situation in the Chechen 
Republic"; 7 Oct 04; (assembly.coe.int). 
(8) Ibid. 
(9) Ibid. 
(10) Resolution 1407 of PACE, ibid. 
(11) Ibid. 
(12) Ibid. 
(13) RIA Novosti, "Georgia Uses PACE to Settle Score With Russia?"; 7 Oct 04 
via (www.en.rian.ru/rian.index.html). 
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Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Robyn Angley 
 
POLITICS AND SOCIETY 
New media limitations 
Curtailment and control of the media continues to be a theme in Russia, from the 
banning of newspaper stands in metro stations (1) to the issuing of eighteen 
media warnings to nationwide news services in the last three months. (2) 
Although the Duma recently voted down a bill restricting media coverage of 
special operations during hostage events, (3) media freedom does not appear to 
have a promising future. 
 
The decision to clear Moscow metro stations of newspaper and other vendors is 
part of the government’s "anti-terrorism" precautions. A side effect of the decision 
is the potential for one media company or a coalition of such companies to 
purchase the rights to metro access. This "anti-terrorism" measure could result in 
the creation of a monopoly for one company (or the state?). (4) 
 
The eighteen warnings issued by the Russian Federal Service for the 
Enforcement of Media Legislation and the Protection of Cultural Heritage have 
the potential to have a serious impact on the media. "…we can raise the issue of 
recalling their licenses after a second similar warning is issued," said Leonid 
Nadirov, First Deputy Minister of Culture and Mass Media. (5) 
 
A new media bill is being examined by the legislature. The bill builds on four 
pillars: freedom of media and prohibition of censorship, the founding of 
newspapers and TV channels, media licensing and registration, and the rights 
and duties of journalists. Some of the points in contention involve the type of 
 17 
censorship being prohibited, whether the Internet qualifies as a form of media 
(thereby falling under the same constraints), and the inclusion of newspaper 
owners in the legislation. (6) 
 
Government news 
The operational details of Putin’s "reforms," initiated as a response to the events 
at Beslan, continue to emerge. The most recent aspects involve the judiciary and 
the implications of the elimination of the direct election of governors. Other items 
include charging under-performing political parties for media election services as 
well as a new piece of legislation affecting non-profit organizations. 
 
The judicial branch constitutes the latest target of Putin’s reforms. The Supreme 
Qualification Collegium is a 29 member body that appoints judges to the 
Supreme Court and the Supreme Arbitration Court. Under current law, the 
Collegium is the only body with authority to dismiss judges. The Federation 
Council bill proposes reducing the number of judges in the Collegium to 21, with 
ten public representatives appointed by the Federation Council, ten judges 
nominated by the President and confirmed by the Federation Council, and one 
person serving as the President’s representative. Collegium judges can be fired 
by the President with the consent of the Collegium under the new bill; authority to 
fire public representatives would rest with the (now emasculated) Federation 
Council. (7) 
 
If the bill passes, it will consolidate additional power in the executive branch. The 
legislature is already in the process of being emasculated; bringing the judicial 
branch under executive appointment will only diminish further dwindling 
remainder of intra-governmental checks and balances. 
 
The details of Putin’s "strengthening of the power vertical" in the executive 
branch became somewhat clearer recently. In addition to the authority to 
nominate governors for the regions, Putin will have the power to dissolve regional 
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legislatures that fail to confirm his nominees. (8) That limits further any regional 
input into the appointment process. 
 
Fourteen political blocs and parties are in debt to the government because of 
election media services, and it is possible that some of them will be disbanded. 
The parties that did not pass the requisite 2% threshold in the State Duma 
election now owe the government for television and radio air time to run 
campaign materials. (9) Apparently, if lack of popular support fails to dissolve a 
political party, the Russian government will speed the process. 
 
A bill involving the taxation of non-profit organizations has the potential to affect 
non-profit funding. Non-profits, in order to make gifts, must be on a special 
government list. If they are not, the recipient will be taxed 25% of the gift. The law 
also requires non-profits to have a "guarantee letter" from the federal or local 
government. (10) This offers considerable opportunities for official corruption. 
The necessity of procuring a letter from the government also could prohibit non-
profits from taking positions that oppose or challenge the government for fear of 
losing their ability to function effectively. The bill is open for amendments until 
October 15; it is slated to go into effect a month later. 
 
The rally phenomena 
There have been several rallies and demonstrations in the last month or so. If 
one accepts rallies as a form of political expression, it is interesting to review the 
subjects of the various demonstrations. One protest unsuccessfully demanded 
the resignation of the president of North Ossetia; (11) a second objected to the 
reduction of public funding for university education; (12) a third was staged by the 
government as an "anti-terrorism" rally following Beslan (13) and an October 3 
march commemorated the events of 1993 during the siege of the White House 
by President Yel'tsin. (14) Over the course of the same month, President Putin 
advocated a number of changes that will affect significantly the distribution of 
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power within the Russian Federation (or, at any rate, formalize his ongoing 
process of power consolidation). 
 
In pursuing these changes, Putin has solicited the help of the media and the 
church, in addition to creating a Public Chamber which may or may not prove to 
be a significant social advisory body. Putin’s overtures to the church were 
somewhat backhanded. His speech to religious leaders solicited their support in 
the national cause of anti-terrorism. In a question and answer session, one of the 
bishops complained about illegal Chinese immigration. Putin serenely suggested 
that the bishop proselytize the immigrants, suggesting that it would be "a great 
area of pastoral work." (15) 
 
What is surprising is the lack of serious political outcry over Putin’s reforms, even 
though some polls suggest that Russians do not favor them. (16) There have 
been no riots or protests over the new laws. Instead, the current demonstrations 
concern economic or security issues, and the reliving of glory days. This would 
suggest that, although Russians may object to the changes, they are more 
concerned about economic and security matters. Of course, it may also reflect an 
acceptance of Putin's consolidation of control and/or apathy because of the 
public's inability to reverse these trends. The media have questioned the reforms, 
but primarily by quoting academics and western governments. (Indeed, it seems 
almost as though Putin spends more time defending his reforms vis-à-vis the 
west than his own constituency.) There appears to be little chance that Russians 
will protest when the measures (and the subsequent curtailment of democratic 
processes) are implemented. 
 
Aleksandr Veshnyakov, head of the Central Electoral Commission, explains: "If 
we put the question frankly — do we wish to remain an integrated state capable 
of protecting civil rights and liberties and ensuring their security? — then, most 
likely, citizens will agree with the reforms." (17) As long as the population sees 
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the reforms as helping maintain a more stable, secure society, it is not likely to 
resist. 
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Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Jeff Kubiak and Kyle Colton 
 
INTERNAL 
Another obstacle removed 
On 29 September, Army General Nikolai Kormiltsev tendered his resignation as 
Commander in Chief of Russia’s Ground Forces. Kormiltsev released the reins of 
Russia’s largest military service and entered a military hospital for examination. 
(1) Although no specific reasons were cited for Kormilstev’s departure, several 
recent developments in the Ministry of Defense, and not medical reasons, are 
likely to have driven him from his post. The recent realignment within the 
Defense Ministry stripped the deputy minister title from the Commander of the 
Ground Forces, kicking that position one level further down the food chain, and 
reducing access to the defense minister and to the president. Additionally, it is 
speculated that Kormiltsev had disagreements with the newly appointed Chief of 
the General Staff, General Baluyevsky. Appointed in 2001 to reform the Ground 
Troops, Kormiltsev resisted certain General Staff's recommendations (including 
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organizing the forces into brigades rather than divisions), but may still have been 
seen as a Kvashnin ally. 
 
A report in Nezavisimaya gazeta listed three possible candidates to fill the now 
vacant Ground Forces Commander position: Colonel General Morozov, Ground 
Forces Chief of General Staff and acting-Commander of the Ground Forces; 
Army General Valentin Bobryshev, commander of the Leningrad Military District; 
and Colonel General Vladimir Boldyrev, commander of the Volga-Urals Military 
District. (3) Morozov is not a "headline grabber" and as ground forces chief of the 
General Staff, he is intimately familiar with the work that needs to be 
accomplished immediately within the ground forces. Bobrysev seems to have 
some political clout and has been mentioned for promotion numerous times over 
the past several years, but is one year away from mandatory retirement and it is 
not likely he’ll leave his post in St Petersburg that he has held comfortably for 
more than 4 years. (4) Boldyrev had previously been seen as someone who 
could lead reform when he was appointed Commander of the North Caucasus 
Military District. He was on an upward career path until July 2004 when he was 
reassigned to Command the Volga-Urals Military District. This was widely 
interpreted as a demotion for his role in not preventing the bloody surprise attack 
by Chechen rebels into Ingushetia earlier this year. (5) A fourth candidate 
recently identified by Interfax-AVN is Col-General Aleksei Maslov, currently the 
Chief of Staff of the North Caucasus Military District. Maslov was moved to his 
current position in 2003, shortly after the upwardly-mobile Boldyrev was moved 
to his post as commander of the that district. Having overseen and managed the 
transition to an all-professional force in Chechnya, Maslov may have the 
experience required to complete the transition throughout the ground forces. (6) 
 
Meeting the threat? 
No national strategy yet exists that is sufficient to guide the comprehensive 
restructuring of the Russian armed forces to put them more in line with the 
current threat environment. Nonetheless, Putin, Ivanov and now Baluyevsky are 
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driving specific efforts to address some of the gaps between current threats and 
current capability by beefing up Ministry of Defense forces in the Caucasus. Putin 
started talking in July of 2004 about Defense Ministry troops reinforcing Interior 
Ministry forces in anti-terrorism efforts. General Baluyevsky recently repeated 
this concept in testimony to the Federation Council. On a number of occasions, 
Ivanov has mentioned the requirement to develop two professional mountainous 
brigades and have them stationed in the Caucasus. Although the details are 
sketchy, there is evidence that there has been action to back up these 
pronouncements. The Finance Ministry has allocated an additional 5 billion 
rubles to be spent in the Caucasus before the end of the year on "a number of 
orders to provide special equipment for the interior and defense ministries to fight 
terrorism," according to the head of the Economic Development Ministry, German 
Gref. (7) The 2005 budget, currently being discussed by the Duma, includes 
more than 6 billion rubles for the construction of two new military bases in the 
Caucasus. (8) Ivanov is still intent on making good on the promise that no 
conscripted servicemen will serve in Chechnya after 1 January 2005. Conversion 
of all power-wielding structures to a professional "contract" force is scheduled to 
be completed by then. (9) But the Russian military has had to expend 
considerable resources to make this political imperative a reality. The contract 
unit in Chechnya, the 42d Motorized Division, is still having retention problems 
despite its personnel getting paid nearly three times the amount offered recruits 
in other districts. (10) 
 
Additionally, the Interfax-AVN website cited statements by Aleksandr Koval, an 
assistant to the 58th Army commander, claiming that Russian army troops will 
conduct a joint exercise with Border Troops in a mountainous region in 
Ingushetia. According to Koval, this is the first such joint exercise between army 
units and the border troops. The reported objective of the exercise is to refine 
joint combat operations and multi-level defense against large enemy forces in 
mountainous terrain. The threat of "large enemy forces" invading from the south 
is questionable, but the location and force composition of this exercise is 
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probably more significant than its stated aim. The exercise is taking place in the 
mountains of Ingushetia very near the border with Georgia and Chechnya with a 
force made up of tanks, armored personnel carriers, and infantry. (11) It is very 
likely that Russia is also using this exercise to send a message to its Georgian 
neighbors. The sum total of the funding, manning, and training efforts in the 
Caucasus involving Defense Ministry troops seems to indicate that Putin and his 
administration expect the Defense Ministry to play an increasing role in Russia’s 
war on terrorism inside, as well as potentially outside, of its national borders. 
 
Hollow force 
Despite considerable efforts to build military capability in the Caucasus to meet 
security needs there, failure to overhaul the Russian military force structure could 
result in a complete collapse of the armed forces. Sergei Ivanov sounded an 
alarm during television remarks on 1 October, but instead of blaming the archaic 
Cold War force structure, he blamed this crisis on the inability of the military to 
call up enough conscripts to fill its ranks. Ivanov claimed that the military stood 
on the verge of collapse because an unprecedented number of persons were 
avoiding the draft due to the poor health of Russian youths, an extraordinary 
number of deferment categories, and corruption. (12) Only 9.5% of draft-eligible 
youths will be called up this fall (compared with 30% just 10 years ago), not 
because that’s all that is needed, but because that is all that is available. 
According to Vasili Smirnov, chief of the Main Organization and Mobilization 
Directorate (GOMU) of the general staff, "We have no military draft reserve and 
we are raking everyone in, leaving nothing behind." (13) In fact, the call up of 
176,400 conscripts will leave a shortfall of more than 30,000 in the ranks of 
Russian military units, leaving many units manned below the 80% level. (14) 
 
The poor quality of the conscripted force presents additional problems. According 
to a report in Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 54% of the young soldiers fit for the draft are 
not fit for service in classified units, to include airborne troops, the navy, and 
missile troops, due to medical deficiencies. One third of the recruits have no 
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secondary education, 40% were "parasites" before joining the army, and 3% had 
criminal records. (15) This leaves most conscripts being attended to by 
specialists instead of commanders and instructors. 
 
In an effort to increase the pool from which to choose its conscripts, Ivanov and 
the Russian army have taken steps to ease the public’s fear of service in the 
armed forces, hoping to reduce the number of young men running away from 
military service. In addition to continuing to advertise that no conscripts will serve 
in Chechnya starting in January of 2005, the Russian army has developed the 
procedures to clothe and feed new recruits at the assembly points rather than 
their units of final destination. This seemingly minor change was designed to 
relieve public fears resulting from a widely publicized case of recruits freezing to 
death. (16) Also, the medical service chief, Major General Valeri Kulikov is 
encouraging young folks not to flee the draft, but rather opt for a shot at medical 
deferment in place of life as a fugitive. According to Kulikov, nearly half of those 
dodging the draft wouldn’t be draft eligible due to medical problems and 
personality disorders. (17) 
 
Obviously frustrated by the mismatch between the troops needed to fill the ranks 
of the Russian army and the conscripts available, Ivanov is prepping the 
battlefield for a future confrontation regarding the politically unpopular prospect of 
doing away with various categories of deferments. Ivanov noted that by 2008, 
contract servicemen are to number 150,000 and compulsory service will be 
reduced from two years to one year. "But then one also has to think about cutting 
down on exemptions, regarding which we are probably world champions. One 
wishes that the new soldiers are healthy and clever." (18) Apparently Ivanov 
thinks that political battle is better joined than is the battle to reduce and re-
structure an overly burdensome military force structure. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
 26 
(1) "Baluyevsky's First Victim; Ground Force Left Without Commander I Chief," 
Nezavisimaya gazeta, 30 Sep 2004; FBIS-SOV-2004-0930 via World News 
Connection. 
(2) Ibid. 
(3) Ibid. 
(4) "Russia: Defense Minister Criticized for Failing to Carry Out Military Reform," 
Financial Times Information 11 Feb 2003; World News Connection via Lexis-
Nexis. 
(5) "Held Accountable for June 22," Vremya novostei 20 Jul 2004; Current Digest 
of the Soviet Press via Lexis-Nexis. 
(6) "Gen. Maslov Expected To Become Commander Of Russian Ground Forces," 
Interfax-AVN Military News Website 11 Oct 04; BBC Monitoring International 
Reports via Lexis-Nexis. 
(7) "Russian Official Says Defense Ministry to Be Allocated Additional 5 Billion 
Rubles," ITAR-TASS, 4 Oct 2004; FBIS-SOV-2004-1004 via World News 
Connection. 
(8) "Military Bases Instead of Housing," Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 1 Oct 2004; What 
the Papers Say via Lexis-Nexis. 
(9) "Russian Defense Minister Expresses Concerns About Military Draft," 
Moscow RIA-Novosti, 1 Oct 2004; FBIS-SOV-2004-1001 via World News 
Connection. 
(10) "Formation of Professional Army in Russia Seen Jeopardized by Low Rates 
of Pay," Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 27 Jul 2004; FBIS-SOV-2004-0727 via World 
News Connection. 
(11) Interfax-AVN, 4 Oct 2004; FBIS-SOV-2004-1004 via World News 
Connection. 
(12) "Russia’s Armed Forces on Verge of Collapse: Defense Minister," Agence 
France Presse, 1 Oct 2004 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(13) "Russia: Fall Military Draft Predicted Shortfall, Problems Viewed," 
Rossiyskaya gazeta, 1 Oct 2004; FBIS-SOV-2004-1001 via World News 
Connection. 
 27 
(14) "Putin’s Autumn Draft Edict Aimed at Strengthening ‘Southern Borders,’" 
Komsomolskaya pravda, Moscow, 29 Sep 2004; BBC Monitoring Former Soviet 
Union via Lexis-Nexis. 
(15) "Russia: Fall Military Draft Predicted Shortfall, Problems Viewed," 
Rossiyskaya gazeta, 1 Oct 2004; FBIS-SOV-2004-1001 via World News 
Connection. 
(16) Ibid. 
(17) "Russia: Reasons for Draft Dodging Discussed and Analyzed," Rossiyskaya 
gazeta, 30 Sep 2004; FBIS-SOV-2004-0930 via World News Connection. 
(18) "Russian Defense Minister Expresses Concerns About Military Draft," 
Moscow RIA-Novosti, 1 Oct 2004; FBIS-SOV-2004-1001 via World News 
Connection. 
 
EXTERNAL 
Russian troops and Tajik border guards 
Russia and Tajikistan appear to be nearing an agreement over the future of 
Tajikistan's border protection. The deputy commander of Russia's border troops, 
Lieutenant General Aleksandr Manilov, concluded a trip to Dushanbe on 4 
October where he finalized the negotiations over the transfer of border security 
from Russian to Tajik troops. 
 
In April of this year, Tajik President Rakhmonov announced that Tajikistan would 
take over control of its own borders and would ask Russian border troops to 
leave the country.(1) His announcement initially was met with concern in the 
West due to perceived Tajik security weakness and on-going narcotics 
smuggling via Tajikistan. In June, President Putin convinced President 
Rakhmonov to put the power transfer on indefinite hold, pending a complete 
review and renegotiations. 
 
With the process back on track, the Russian and Tajik delegations have 
concluded a draft agreement on the details of the hand over of border sections. 
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The proposed agreement stipulates that Russia's border troops will retain an 
operational/liaison group in Tajikistan, train Tajik border troop officers, and 
provide Tajik border troops with modern Russian equipment. 
 
Approximately 11,500 Russian Border Troops, mostly ethnic Tajiks, cover Tajik 
borders. (2) Russian border troops were phased out from Kyrgyzstan in 1999. In 
the same year, Russian military advisors left Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan 
withdrew from the Collective Security Treaty. With the apparently successful 
elections in Afghanistan and ongoing U.S.-led counterterrorism operations in the 
region, Tajikistan wants to display to its regional competitors and neighbors that it 
too can defend its own borders. 
 
While President Rakhmonov seems motivated by national pride and regional 
competition, President Putin is likely more interested in formalizing a basing 
agreement with Tajikistan for the 201st Motorized Rifle division. That division has 
lacked legal status since its "CIS Peacekeeping Mission" was terminated in 1999. 
During previous negotiations, Tajikistan wanted a significant say regarding the 
201st Division's base operations, personnel movements, and its use in various 
contingencies. It also wanted more significant financial compensation for Russian 
military use of Tajikistan's land and infrastructure. Rakhmonov’s desire for control 
of his own borders seems to have given Putin a very large bargaining chip and 
reinvigorated discussions. 
 
Tajik border concerns 
"I have been serving in the Russian border guards for over 20 years. I do not 
have any other profession and if the Russian Forces really do leave Badakhshan, 
my seven children and I will lose our means of subsistence," Ensign Nazar 
Mavlonazarov, who lives on the Tajik-Afghan border and works with Russian 
forces stationed along frontier, stated. (3) 
 
 29 
Mavlonazarov added "As an experience border guard, I can say with certainty 
that the Tajik forces do not yet have the necessary experience nor the equipment 
to guarantee the security of this border."(4) 
 
The plans to withdraw Russian troops from the Pamir section of Tajikistan's 
frontier with Afghanistan have caused significant concern amongst local 
residents, many of whom have staged protests in recent weeks to highlight their 
worries. Large segments of the population living in southeastern Tajikistan rely 
on jobs created by the presence of Russian troops for their economic survival. 
Many locals worry that plans for a withdrawal could result in an influx of drugs 
and other criminal activity from Afghanistan. 
 
Russian-trained Tajik soldiers, who serve in the Border Guard, receive 
approximately 300 dollars per month. Tajik funded border guards make between 
10 to 40 dollars per month. Based on evidence from the Beslan tragedy where 
terrorists bribed their way through several checkpoints, many locals are 
concerned that corruption will become wide-spread and allow drugs to flow easily 
through Tajikistan. Tajik President Emomali Rakhmonov downplays these 
concerns and instead is determined to have Tajiks control the border by the end 
of this year. "The border is a symbol of the state's independence, it is unheard of 
for the border of one nation to be protected by border guards from another," he 
said earlier this year. (5) 
 
International border concerns 
The United Nations is also concerned about the protection of the Tajik-Afghan 
border in the event that Russian border guards are pulled out of the area. The 
U.N. Secretary General's Envoy to Tajikistan, Vladimir Sotirov, told journalists on 
20 September, that Tajikistan's national border guard structures will have to 
spend "considerable funds to attain the level of equipment of Russian border 
troops." (6) Sotirov believes the international community's assistance to 
Tajikistan in this matter is of extreme importance. "So this assistance is being 
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already given and will be continued," he pointed out. "We are all interested in the 
lessening of the narcotic drug traffic through the Tajikistani-Afghan border to 
European countries." (7) According to the Russian Federal Security Service 
(FSB) press service, border guards have confiscated over 2.6 tons of narcotics 
on the Tajik-Afghan border, two-thirds of which consists of heroin, since the 
beginning of the year. (8) 
 
On 21 September, Sotirov appeared to refine his position. "The decision made by 
the Tajikistani authorities to strengthen the country's independence through 
agreements with Russia on the gradual withdrawal of Russian border guards 
from the Tajik-Afghan border seems right to me," he stated in Dushanbe on 
Tuesday. (9) This measure "will not leave Tajikistan without the support it needs 
to ensure security on its southern borders as the global community is keeping an 
eye on this process. The international community is ready to provide and is 
providing Tajikistan with assistance," he said. (10) 
 
Russia military and border security 
Chief of the General Staff Colonel General Yuri Baluyevsky signed a directive 
outlining required security measures for Russian military units and civilian 
facilities located on the territory of CIS states. (11) Since the Beslan tragedy, the 
Russian Armed Forces have started already to upgrade the antiterrorist security 
system throughout the former Soviet republics. The use of Russian law 
enforcement organizations for military unit protection is not allowed in Tajikistan 
and the 201st division commanders can only count on collaboration with local 
security agencies. This type of collaboration often does not succeed, because 
national law enforcement systems in most CIS countries are still being 
established and hence are not always effective. The Russian Ministry of Defense 
noted that the creation of a reliable security system in Tajikistan in the near term 
was unlikely. (12) Local law enforcement agencies in Tajikistan have limited 
authority and security for the facilities of the 201st Motorized Infantry Division is 
left to the military leaders. The current garrisons of the 201st are spread out. In 
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Dushanbe, the buildings housing the officers' families are not even located on the 
divisional bases. 
 
The Russian Federation's military department admits it is extremely difficult to 
protect facilities based in the Central Asian states, where extremist religious 
organizations such as Hizb al-Tahrir, the Islamic Movement of Turkestan, and 
others are stepping up their activities. (13) If the 201st division could be located 
at a centralized base, then the new force protection requirements would be much 
easier to achieve. 
 
Conclusion 
Since September 11, 2001, the influence of the United States has increased in 
Central Asia, causing a consequent decline in Russian stature. In the last week, 
Kyrgyzstan signed military cooperation agreements with the U.S. and France. 
(14) President Putin may have reached the point where he feels it necessary to 
counterbalance American influence. While weakening the border security does 
not seem to be in Russia’s interest, the Kremlin has used Tajik national pride on 
the border issue to negotiate a favorable agreement. The final status of the 201st 
division likely will resolved in Moscow’s favor. It probably will include new basing 
rights that allow the military to consolidate its position and ease the force 
protection burden. The military arrangement might be semi-permanent and 
ensure that the Russian military has a primary role in Central Asia for the 
foreseeable future. Finally, the international community, fearing the Tajik-Afghan 
border being exclusively in Tajik hands, likely will pay a significant amount of the 
future security costs. Russia seems to have reinforced its Central Asia position at 
almost no cost to itself. 
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Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Elena Selyuk 
 
UKRAINE 
Disruption of the presidential elections in Ukraine 
There is more and more talk in Ukraine about the possibility of the Ukrainian 
presidential elections being disrupted. There is rampant speculation as to the 
specifics of the various plots, but the goal of these "conspirators" seems to be 
uniform — to prevent the opposition from coming to power. 
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Version one comes directly from Viktor Yushchenko, who called the disruption of 
the presidential elections in Ukraine a "working scenario" of the current Ukrainian 
authorities. (1) This scenario consists of printing fake ballots and distributing 
them in the regions; mass firing of directors of state printing houses and 
replacing them with individuals willing to cooperate with the current government; 
preventing Ukrainian expatriates from voting at 114 voting stations, which have 
been set up outside of Ukraine’s borders; controlling the voting situation in 
prisons and closed medical facilities, as well as, of course, continuing the 
campaign of mass intimidation of state workers (militia, doctors, teachers). If all 
else fails, and the opposition has a clear lead, then stage two of the working 
scenario comes into play, where numerous violations are declared to have taken 
place in different regions, thus negating the election results based on massive 
fraud. (2) 
 
Yushchenko called on Ukrainian citizens to prevent possible election disruptions: 
"You are capable of the small feat of being vigilant from morning till night and of 
being prepared to defend your right to elect those you want." (3) 
 
An alternate version of the election fraud theories adds the element of Russian 
involvement in the plot to disrupt the elections. Russian political analyst Stanislav 
Belkovsky expressed an opinion that the idea to cancel the Ukrainian elections 
was conceived by Viktor Medvedchuk, who is supported strongly by Moscow. (4) 
Among the reasons for Putin not wanting Yushchenko to be the next president 
are, obviously, the concern that Ukraine would "drift away" from the Russian 
sphere of influence. Moscow might full well support the idea of disrupting the 
elections, which would prolong the regime of the current authorities, but it doesn't 
seem to have the capability on its own to have any noticeable influence on the 
outcome of the elections. Russia has no real infrastructure that could help it 
protect its interests in Ukraine, says Aleksandr Kochetkov, the president of the 
National Strategy Institute in Moscow. There is no noticeable pro-Russian 
movement in Ukraine, and no strong pro-Russian political party. There are 
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neither political lobbyists present in the country, nor large mass media 
organization with pro-Russian orientation, and there are no means of supporting 
such organizations financially. In fact, Russia does not even have a clear political 
strategy towards Ukraine. Political affairs are often settled as a result of direct 
collaboration of the two presidents — Putin and Kuchma. (5) 
 
Finally, the third version of conspiracy theory holds that Leonid Kuchma is still 
not out of the picture. While he is not a registered candidate for the presidential 
race, should the election be disrupted and cancelled, he, as Prime Minister, is the 
person who retains power. And the longer he holds on to power, the more time 
he has to conduct political reform, which, could render presidential elections and 
the new president himself ceremonial attributes of the new and improved 
parliamentary democracy. 
 
BELARUS 
Belarus Democracy Act 
The upcoming parliamentary elections in Belarus, as well as the political situation 
in the country, have failed to evoke indignation from the West for a long time. 
Lukashenko and his cabinet simply disregard any attempt to sanction him. The 
most recent attempt to convince Lukashenko to observe at least some norms of 
democracy seems to have been largely ignored as well. On 4 October, the U.S. 
House of Representatives passed the Belarus Democracy Act. The Act consists 
of five demands. They are (a) the requirement to release individuals, who have 
been imprisoned for political and religious convictions, (b) to recall politically 
motivated accusations against all opposition figures and independent journalists, 
(c) to explain fully the disappearance of Belarusian opposition figures and 
journalists, including Viktor Gonchar, Anatoli Krasovskiy, Dmitry Zabadsky, etc., 
(d) to stop all forms of intimidation against independent mass media outlets, 
independent professional unions, NGOs and religious organizations, as well as of 
the political opposition in Belarus and (e) to conduct free and fair presidential and 
parliamentary elections. (6) 
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In case of Lukashenko’s noncompliance, the U.S. promised to allocate $ 40 
million to the support of the Belarusian opposition, and threatened to make public 
information about Lukashenko’s personal income and the unlawful Belarusian 
arms. (7) 
 
Lukashenko’s reaction to the Act was rather harsh. He answered with attacks: 
"They want democracy in Belarus! They are worried about our elections and our 
referendum! They forgot that they have more than enough problems of their 
own… The U.S. has the most outdated election system. They do not have direct 
presidential elections,…as a result, the president who is in power now received 
less votes than the one who came in second. Is that normal?" (8) Lukashenko 
also offered to disclose to Belarusians his income, which is "a hundred thousand 
times smaller than their [American] president’s, or of any president, for that 
matter." (9) 
 
Chances are almost non-existent that the current Act will have any influence on 
Lukashenko, since he is in complete control of official opinion and of the mass 
media, he is capable of escaping any criticism leveled at him from inside the 
country. Thus, the current Act serves more as a symbolic gesture showing that 
the U.S. is not completely indifferent to the situation in Belarus. As for promises 
to allocate $40 million to the Belarusian opposition, they came too late. With only 
several days remaining before the elections and with Lukashenko’s tight control 
of all opposition activities, only a miracle can help the Belarusian opposition. 
 
Meanwhile, only a fraction of those opposition candidates who applied to 
participate in the elections, was allowed to do so. For example, out of 17 
candidates of the opposition block "Young Belarus," only four were permitted to 
participate in the elections. Among the reasons for denial were "premature 
beginning of the election campaign" and "blasphemy of the authorities." (10) In 
the beginning of September, in Grodno, Valeri Levonevsky and Alexandr Vasil’ev 
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were sentences to two years in prison for "offending the President." Both of them 
were calling Belarusians out to join the action of protest against the President, 
who at the time was vacationing at an Austrian ski resort, at public expense. (11) 
Three more newspapers have been closed recently. "Regional Newspaper" was 
closed for three months as a result of two warnings, which were issued by the 
Information Ministry on the same day for violations of the media law: publishing 
an unregistered TV guide and switching to a weekly publication schedule without 
prior notification. (12) Two more newspapers, Navinki and Novaya gazeta of 
Smorgoni, were closed for similar "violations." 
 
It is clear that the elections in Belarus will be neither fair nor free. The opposition 
has no opportunity to succeed. Feeble Western voices promising to help the 
Belarusian opposition on the eve of the elections came too late. Very few 
opposition representatives are included in the electoral committees. As for 
independent observers, they can only observe the voting process and not the 
vote counting process! (13) Even if a miniscule number of the opposition 
candidates manages to get into the lower chamber of the parliament, this will not 
constitute any threat to the current regime, since, according to the Belarusian 
constitution, all real power belongs to the President. One cannot help but 
wonder, why does the unconquerable President bother with any elections at all? 
 
MOLDOVA 
Proposed referendum in Transdniestr 
There have been numerous demands from the population of Transdniestr about 
holding a referendum in the unrecognized Dniestr republic on the issue of 
building a federation with Moldova, since, under the Dniestr constitution, the 
Dniestr republic is a "sovereign and independent state." A working group, which 
consists of three deputies from the regional parliament and three executive 
power representatives is to begin the process of preparing the referendum in the 
near future. (14) 
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Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Ariela Shapiro 
 
Armenia 
Kocharian breaking out of the box 
Robert Kocharian’s Yerevan government is expanding bilateral relations with Iran 
and Georgia and apparently is considering reopening its border with Turkey. 
Through these diplomatic efforts, Kocharian hopes to end Armenia’s almost total 
political isolation in the South Caucasus. Known as the "stepchild of the South 
Caucasus," due to its weak geo-strategic position, Armenia previously resorted to 
Russian support against Azerbaijan. Russia’s efforts to counter U.S. influence in 
oil-rich Azerbaijan has weakened Yerevan’s bargaining power. 
 38 
 
Robert Kocharian defies Armenia’s interests as securing reliable energy supplies 
and foreign investment, opening its borders to trade, preventing Azerbaijan from 
reasserting sovereignty over Nagorna-Karabakh, and forging closer military and 
economic relations with the West. To pursue its perceived interests, Yerevan had 
opted for a foreign policy of, as phrased by Armenia expert Richard Hovannisian, 
"complementarity," (1) which involves cultivating friendly relations with the world 
and the three major regional powers: Iran, the U.S. and Russia. The aim of the 
"complementarity" policy is to place Armenia into a network of associations with 
other states based on convergent interests. Yerevan’s policy may be compared 
to Tbilisi’s pro-Western orientation and with Baku’s balancing act between the 
U.S. and Russia. Additionally, Armenia is hamstrung by its "complementarity" 
policy since it cannot support NATO unequivocally. The Western alliance 
includes Turkey, favors Azerbaijan and has a primary interest in the construction 
of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. Yerevan does not have the resources to 
pursue a balance of power strategy by playing off the U.S. and Russia against 
each other, as Baku, with its Caspian oil reserves, attempts to do. Since Yerevan 
lacks the resources to execute the "complementarity" policy, it has become a 
façade for almost total dependence on Russia. Kocharian understands Armenia’s 
inherent weakness and for that reason, his government is trying to establish 
better relations with Georgia and Turkey. 
 
Armenian-Georgian bilateral relations have developed from Kocharian’s 
ambivalent acceptance in December 2003 of Tbilisi's Rose Revolution to a full 
acceptance of Saakashvili’s government in May 2004. In July 2004, the 
Armenian and Georgian Foreign Ministers met to discuss European integration, 
economic and strategic cooperation, and further political relations. (2) Their talks 
provided the catalyst for further military, diplomatic and economic cooperative 
measures between Tbilisi and Yerevan. At present, the Georgian and Armenian 
Justice Ministries and Ombudsmen share information and are involved in joint 
operations as is evidenced by the 4 October apprehension of a smuggling ring in 
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Armenia by the Georgian and Armenian border police. (3) Diplomats are also 
participating in an exchange from 6 October-29 October in Yerevan and Tbilisi 
program to increase cross-cultural awareness. (4) On the economic side, the 
Armenian-Georgian Association for Business Cooperation was created on 5 
October in Tbilisi and will meet every 3 months to discuss further microeconomic 
integration between the two countries. (5) Furthermore, Georgia is trying to 
establish smooth relations with Armenia as indicated by Saakashvili 
announcement that he passed no judgment on the Yerevan government for the 
ongoing conflict in Nagorna-Karabakh. 
 
While Armenian-Georgian relations are progressing, Yerevan has drawn still 
closer to Tehran. In September, the two governments signed a preliminary 
agreement to construct a pipeline that would carry natural gas from Iran to 
Armenia, with substantial funding from Tehran. The pipeline would ease 
Armenia’s dependence on Russia but will not alter the country’s fundamental 
strategic position. Moscow, seeking to keep Yerevan under its hegemony, has 
demanded assurances that the Iranian pipeline will not be extended through 
Georgia and under the Black Sea to Ukraine, bypassing Russia and depriving it 
of a market for its gas. 
 
Kocharian’s government has also taken cautious steps toward approaching 
Ankara to resolve their long-standing dispute over the Armenian genocide by the 
"Ottoman" Turks. Armenian Defense Minister Sarkisian met with his counterpart 
on 30 September in Ankara, while Armenian Foreign Minister Oskanian has been 
in communication with his Turkish counterpart since mid August. (6) Although it is 
in the economic and strategic interest of Armenia to open its border with Turkey, 
nationalistic ideology continues to impede that goal. As is becoming evident 
however, Armenian political parties may be using the genocide issue to cover up 
weaknesses in Armenia’s economy. The strongest political opponent to the 
unconditional opening of the border is the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, a 
junior partner in the ruling coalition. Ashot Yeghiazarian, the party’s chairman, 
 40 
stated at a round-table discussion for politicians and economists on 29 
September, that establishing cross-border relations with Turkey would cause a 
flood of cheap Turkish goods into the Armenian market, which would weaken 
local manufacturers. (7) Another impediment to Yerevan establishing 
independent, bilateral relations with Ankara is Moscow's role as an intermediary 
in any concerted effort to improve Yerevan-Ankara relations; Russia reportedly is 
playing this role in discussions on restoring rail links between Armenia and 
Turkey. 
 
Yerevan is restricted by its dependence on Moscow from moving too far toward 
an independent foreign policy. The best-case scenario for Yerevan would be an 
agreement by Moscow and the United States to guarantee the security of 
Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia, and treat them each as independent actors 
within a single region. The likelihood that Russia would agree is not great. 
 
Georgia 
Don’t count your presidents before they hatch… 
Although the outcome of the chaotic 3 October "presidential election" in 
Georgia’s separatist region of Abkhazia is still uncertain, one major loser is 
obvious: Moscow. Russia’s heavy-handed involvement in the campaign and its 
open endorsement of Prime Minister Raul Khajimba in the first contested ballot in 
Abkhazia instead have benefited the opposition candidate Sergei Bagapsh. 
 
Moscow pursued its objective of securing Abkhazian political continuity and 
installing its favorite, Raul Khajimba, by endorsing a range of artificial public 
relations events. These PR measures included Russian President Vladimir Putin 
meeting with Khajimba in Sochi on 30 August to discuss the "future of Abkhazia," 
covering Abkhazia with photos of Khajimba and Putin together, and running an 
advertising campaign on controlled TV channels. (8) Throughout September, 
Russian politicians visited Abkhazia and campaigned on Khajimba’s behalf. At 
first no one objected to Moscow’s intervention, until Russian politicians used 
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Victory Day celebrations, the anniversary of the 1992-93 war, as a forum for their 
support of Khajimba. (9) Moscow's public relations blunder radically changed 
public opinion towards Khajimba. Additionally, Russian nationalist politician 
Vladimir Zhirinovsky damaged Moscow's image further when he publicly stated 
that not voting for Khajimba will guarantee a closure of the Abkhaz-Russian 
border and an economic blockade. (10) Ironically, Abkhazia would have voted for 
Khajimba without Zhirinovsky's threats or Russian electoral machinations, but the 
Kremlin's interference has caused political confusion, increased tensions and 
resentment towards Moscow. 
 
On 4 October, a website, claiming to be the Central Electoral Commission's, 
declared Khajimba winner of the 3 October presidential election. According to the 
website, Khajimba received 52.8% of the vote, while runner-up Sergei Bagapsh 
received 33.8%. The website even posted a graph displaying the distribution of 
the votes. (11) However, later that day the graph was removed and the CEC 
denied it even had a website, adding that all earlier reports released through the 
newswires regarding preliminary results were not valid. After closing the 
erroneous website, the CEC then declined to publish any results; the opposition 
calculated that Bagapsh garnered 51% of the vote and Khajimba had 38% of the 
vote. (12) The opposition’s announcement led Khajimba to organize a rally in 
Sokhumi on 5 October at which he declared that the election had been marred by 
widespread irregularities, especially in the Gali district, an area populated by 
primarily ethnic Georgians. Khajimba added he wanted the first round of the 
election annulled, and all votes recast. The alleged irregularities included an 
electrical failure in some of the polling stations, and the distribution of documents 
in Georgian, which contradicts local law. Bagapsh and his supporters, who 
appear to have done well in the Gali district, rejected Khajimba’s accusations. 
(13) 
 
On 6 October, Sergei Smyr, head of the CEC, announced a proposal for a recast 
of the vote, only in the Gali region, on 17 October. (14) Georgian officials are 
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worried that the decisive role this district is about to play in the Abkhazian 
elections may trigger further violence against Georgians there. Georgian Minister 
for Conflict Resolution Goga Khaindrava stated on 6 October that he hopes the 
Sokhumi authorities safeguard the rights and safety of its Gali residents, while 
Saakashvili announced that any violence towards Gali Georgians would only 
further validate the corrupt nature of the Sokhumi government. (15) 
 
The outcome of the elections confirms the pessimistic forecasts expressed 
shortly before the vote. Georgian authorities and the international community 
unanimously dismissed the presidential race as illegal. Nevertheless, in a 
statement issued on 4 October, the Russian Foreign Ministry described the 
presidential elections in Abkhazia as "calm" and "democratic" while conveying 
hope that the Abkhaz "elections" would encourage both the Georgian and 
Abkhaz sides to continue talks to resolve the ongoing separatist conflict. (16) 
Russia’s pushy approach has almost assured the victory of a candidate who is 
currently beyond Moscow’s influence. Ironically, the difference between the two 
leading candidates, Khajimba and Bagapsh, may not be that significant. Even 
though Khajimba voices Moscow’s interests while Bagapsh pretends to be more 
independent, the latter will inevitably seek a common ground with Moscow. 
Moscow’s tactless and brazen approach in the political process in Abkhazia, may 
have stimulated a discontent with Russia that will have an effect, if not a 
particularly strong one, on Russian Abkhaz, and possibly Russian-Georgian 
relations. 
 
Georgia and Chechnya: PACE Session 
The Russian delegation to the 4-8 October session of the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) clashed with European and Georgian 
officials over its policies vis-à-vis Chechnya and the South Caucasus. 
 
While the Russian draft resolution on terrorism, submitted by Duma Foreign 
Relations Committee Chairman Konstantin Kosachev, was met with resistance 
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by representative from the E.U., the newly-inaugurated Chechen leader Alu 
Alkhanov battled doubts regarding his legitimacy. The pro-Moscow Chechen 
president criticized PACE for its position on the political situation in Chechnya, 
stating PACE gave more credence to Maskhadov’s government than to 
Alkhanov’s administration. (17) Earlier that day, PACE adopted a resolution 
criticizing the August presidential elections in Chechnya for deviations from 
democratic norms. Deputies also rejected a proposed Russian amendment 
recognizing Alkhanov’s legitimacy. (18) Alkhanov, who was sworn in as head of 
the pro-Moscow government in Grozny on 5 October, denounced the PACE’s 
decision as "robbing the Chechen people" of their inherent right and ability to 
elect a leader. (19) 
 
Russian representatives also battled the Georgian delegation in a public debate 
as the latter pushed forward its vision of Russia as an inhibiting factor in the 
economic and political development of the South Caucasus. MP Giga Bokeria 
accused the Kremlin of double standards when dealing with its internal, i.e. 
Chechnya, and external, in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, problems. (20) In 
response, the Russian delegation accused the Georgian delegation of seeking 
international support and "preparing public opinion" for a possible military 
resolution to Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts. (21) The debates ran over 
an hour but they were not meant to deliver specific resolutions; the intention was 
to draw more international attention towards the conflicts in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. 
 
Source Notes: 
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http://www.genocide1915.info/articles_view.asp?crypt=%86u%A1%85f.com. 
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(4) Rustavi-2 TV, 7 Oct 04; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
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Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
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By Fabian Adami 
 
Kazakhstan 
Election fallout continues 
Last month, on 19 September, the Republic of Kazakhstan held its second 
Parliamentary elections since independence. During the weeks and months prior 
to the polls, it was evident that an attempt was being made to present a 
democratic image at home and abroad. Yet the run-up to the election was 
marred by serious political machinations, which seemed to be designed with a 
dual purpose. Firstly, the aim was to ensure a significant victory for President 
Nursultan Nazarbaev’s Otan party. Secondly, it seemed clear that the elections 
were designed to provide a clear path for the succession of Dariga Nazarbaeva, 
the President’s oldest daughter. (1) 
 
The final election results, as presented on 7 October, vindicated these 
suspicions. Otan obtained an overwhelming 60.61% of votes, while 
Nazarbaeva’s Asar Party achieved 11.38% in the polls. (2) In terms of total seats 
obtained, this meant that Asar won three seats in the Majlis (lower house), 
making it the second largest pro-Presidential party in the system. (3) 
 
But if the Nazarbaev family achieved its personal goals in these elections, it 
failed in the attempt to project a democratic image. The polls were not only 
criticized by the OSCE, which found that the election "fell short of OSCE and 
Council of Europe standards for democratic elections," and that there had been a 
"lack of transparency" in the process," (4) but also by Kazakhstan’s opposition 
groups, which indicated that they might not accept the results. (5) 
 
After filing a law suit with the Kazakh Supreme Court accusing the Central 
Election Commission of "flagrant violations of constitutional rights of citizens," (6) 
Ak Zhol announced that it planned, (along with Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan 
and the Communist Party), to organize a nationwide protest against the 
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elections. (7) According to reports in Eurasianet, Kazakhstan’s opposition figures 
stated that they hoped the protests might result in a "rose revolution," similar to 
the one in Georgia that overthrew Eduard Shevardnadze as President. (8) At the 
same time, the opposition announced that a protest might be halted, if 
Nazarbaev’s government made moves to address the opposition parties’ 
complaints vis-à-vis the election. (9) 
 
President Nazarbaev’s reaction to the ultimatum was to state that the election 
had been the result of "painstaking work," while accusing the opposition parties 
of "straining the political situation," and of "undermining the country’s 
international image." (10) In the almost two-weeks since the call to protest was 
made, there has been few reports of action by the opposition, and no protests 
have been recorded, by any media outlets. 
 
Meanwhile, President Nazarbaev has proceeded with his governmental 
‘restructuring.’ A new Ministry, responsible for Emergency Situations has been 
formed. It will be headed by Mukhambet Kopeev, until now Deputy Chairman of 
the Majlis. (11) At the same time, a Presidential Decree merged the Ministries of 
Culture and Information (formerly headed by Altynbek Sarsenbayev), and 
abolished several other government agencies, including customs control, 
demography, and state procuring. All of the aforementioned functions are to be 
assigned to other Ministries. (12) 
 
The ‘restructuring’ that is occurring appears more threatening when it is viewed in 
conjunction with another post-election development, namely a move to institute 
President Nazarbaev’s Otan party as the "institutionalized" ruling party. (13) 
According to Yermukhamet Yertysbayev, aide to Nazarbaev, this is possible 
because the party obtained such a large segment of the vote. Yertysbayev 
insisted that such a move would not lead to the creation of a one-party state 
since constitutional change would be required. This was impossible, he added, 
because "political pluralism has taken too deep root in our country." (14) 
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These statements must be viewed with skepticism: the ‘restructuring’ which is 
taking place shows signs of being little more than a move to consolidate power 
into fewer hands. At the same time, the seeming lack of demonstrations in 
Kazakhstan — as well as the possible institutionalization of Otan — suggest a 
move that Yertysbayev denies: toward a one party state. 
 
Kyrgyzstan’s foreign relations game 
In 2003, Global Scholarly Publications, a New York publisher, released an 
English translation of Kyrgyzstan’s new foreign policy doctrine. Written by 
President Askar Akaev, the document, entitled Diplomacy of the Silk Road (A 
Foreign Policy Doctrine), posits a "revival of the Great Silk Road," with 
Kyrgyzstan at its center. (15) Akaev notes in the polemic that Kyrgyzstan "in view 
of its geographical location" has a need and "favorable opportunity for 
simultaneously developing fruitful relations between Kyrgyzstan and neighboring 
countries, Kyrgyzstan and Europe, and Kyrgyzstan and East and South-East 
Asia." (16) Akaev’s intimation is that Kyrgyzstan can and must serve as a bridge 
for "friendship and cooperation" (as well as its own benefit) between the 
countries in the region. 
 
In recent weeks, there has been a spate of activity with regards to Kyrgyz foreign 
policy, which indicates that Akaev is now actively planning to implement the new 
Silk Road Strategy: Kyrgyzstan has held–or is planning–high level talks with Iran, 
the United States, Germany, France and Britain. 
 
On 29 September, while speaking at Harvard University, Akaev stated that 
security in Central Asia cannot be achieved without Russian influence and help. 
(17) Days later, on 6 October, Lieutenant General Yevgenii Yurev, visiting 
elements of his command at Kant airbase in Kyrgyzstan, announced that an 
agreement had been reached between Moscow and Bishkek to raise Russian 
troop levels in Kyrgyzstan to 1000 by the end of 2004. (18) At the same time, 
 48 
Kyrgyzstan has sought actively to increase its cooperation with the United States 
in the War on Terrorism. 
 
On 2 October, a series of talks took place between senior U.S. and Kyrgyz 
officials regarding Kyrgyz-U.S. military cooperation. According to Kabar news 
agency, agreement has been reached, extending military cooperation for another 
five years (2005-2010). (19) Under the plans, U.S. Special Forces A-Teams will 
provide assistance in the creation of Kyrgyz Special Forces units, the U.S. will 
provide funding for the creation of an anti-terrorist center, and will aid in 
enhancing Kyrgyzstan’s air mobility capabilities. (20) 
 
Kyrgyzstan’s expansion of military cooperation agreements has not stopped with 
Russia and the U.S.. Britain has stepped up its commitment to provide language 
training to the Kyrgyz military, while France recently signed its own cooperation 
agreement with the Central Asian republic. Under the terms of this agreement, 
French Special Forces will undergo some mountain training in Kyrgyzstan, and 
there will be annual officer exchanges between the two countries. (21) 
 
On the non-military front, Kyrgyzstan has increased up its cooperation with Iran. 
Between 28-29 September, Iranian First Vice-President Mohammad Reza Aref 
traveled to Kyrgyzstan. During the course of his visit Aref met with President 
Akaev, Prime Minister Nikolai Tanayev, as well as People’s Assembly speaker 
Altay Borubayev. (22) As a result of these talks, the Iranian government has 
agreed to increase significantly its investment and trade levels with Bishkek: a 
$50 million dollar loan for Kyrgyzstan was negotiated, and trade levels between 
the two nations are to be increased to $250 million by the end of this year. (23) 
 
Based on these developments, it would seem that President Akaev’s plan for 
Kyrgyzstan to be a focal point for cooperation and trade in Central Asia is 
succeeding. But, in fact, Akaev is playing a dangerous game. Kyrgyzstan’s close 
relationship with Iran could become a source of tension, should the U.S. decide 
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to focus more seriously on that country’s transgressions. At the same time, to 
hope conflict does not develop in a region which (due to its natural resources) 
has great geo-strategic importance to multiple powers seems to represent an 
extremely naïve and short-term viewpoint. 
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